Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this joint work with Catherine Rainer (U. Brest), we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global planner can achieve. We find a structure condition on the game under which there exists efficient MFG equilibria and, in case this condition is not fulfilled, quantify how inefficient MFG equilibria are.
Recording during the meeting "Crowds: Models and Control" the June 06, 2019 at the Centre International de Rencontres Mathématiques (Marseille, France)
Filmmaker: Guillaume Hennenfent
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